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Current network protection technologies often require code recompilation to integrate 
new technologies, can be prone to denial of service attacks, may require invasive 
software applications to provide an automated response, and provide little to no 
protection against unknown threats. Unknown threat discovery generally requires an 
expert human analyst in an impractical labor-intensive process, but these analysts are in 
short supply. A Vector Relational Data Modeling approach was implemented to automate 
the human-intensive decision-making and subsequent response processes when a 
common phpMyAdmin attack is suspected. We modeled constituent component 
technologies and data sources within the Global Information Network Architecture, a 
DOD network certified information modeling framework, and constructed a cyber test 
range consisting of multiple servers. This implementation and testing of Reactive 
Aggregate Model Protecting Against Real-time Threats demonstrated the successful 
employment of an information apparatus that executed the complex processes necessary 
to mitigate phpMyAdmin cyber threat detection and response. 
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The cyber threat environment is complex and evolving necessitating that 
organizations take defensive measures encompassing various domains of expertise on 
systems and processes that must rapidly adapt to mitigate network vulnerabilities. A 
holistic solution to this complex, dynamic, and heterogeneous problem does not lend 
itself well to specialized, stove-piped, and conventional methods. 
A. TASKING STATEMENT 
The tasking for this capstone project was directed by U.S. Navy Fleet Cyber 
Command/10th Fleet, N5, Captain Roy Petty, to explore solutions in the cyber threat 
environment; through Dr. Shelley Gallup, director, NPS Distributed Information Systems 
and Experimentation (DISE) research group; Dr. Thomas S. Anderson, United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Engineering Research and Development (ERDC), 
Center Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL); and Mr. Scott 
McKenzie, Research Associate, DISE research group. The project was funded by N1 
through the NPS OPNAV Naval Studies Program. The tasking was to implement an 
information modeling solution in the Global Information Network Architecture (GINA) 
framework for a cyber-threat detection model; see Appendix A. 
The key points in the tasking are the following: 
• Develop prototype cyber attack detection capability. 
• Create a unified process and behavior model for key capabilities. 
• Transition from responding to detected threats to developing techniques 
and capabilities to hunt for and respond to potentially threatening 
network probes before systems have been compromised. 
• Incorporate Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) into the 
information apparatus to enable semi-automation of tasks and allow 




B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) provide a limited degree of 
protection to computer networks. Comprehensive protection of a network requires 
personnel to continuously monitor network traffic for possible or real threats. 
Specifically, it necessitates analyzing system logs in real-time to immediately detect and 
respond to an attack. This human labor-intensive process is not practical for many 
organizations due to the high volume of network traffic. Network traffic coupled with the 
persistent and sophisticated nature of cyber threats increases an organization’s 
vulnerability to attacks. Additionally, false positives and false negatives in detecting 
attacks complicate an analyst’s ability to accurately identify a real attack and respond to it 
in a timely manner. 
Adequately posturing against attacks using conventional materials and methods is 
resource intensive and expensive, especially for a large organization. Creating a 
dynamically configurable, extensible, and scalable cyber defense model will facilitate 
sustaining an organization’s cybersecurity posture at a reduced cost and a decreased 
invesent of manpower, training, and equipment. One approach to solving the resource-
intensive overhead problem is by automating the human decision-making process. An 
efficient and effective cybersecurity system can be implemented using Vector Relational 
Data Modeling (VRDM) to simulate the decision process of an expert network security 
analyst. The RAMPART project sought to implement a cost effective, scalable, 
cybersecurity model capable of near real-time, semi-cognitive decision-making and 
automated response.  
This capstone was divided into four phases. First, the team designed and 
implemented a proof-of-concept information apparatus based on a Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) thesis Automated Cyber Threat Analysis and Specified Process Using 
Vector Relational Data Modeling [1] that postulates that a VRDM model is capable of 
near real-time response to phpMyAdmin cyber attacks. Second, a cyber test range was 
constructed. Third, constituent technology software components were assembled for use 




honeypot Apache webserver using both simulated and real-world phpMyAdmin attacks. 












A. CYBER THREAT DOMAIN 
The initial development of the Internet was highly focused on enabling the flow 
of information. Security concerns have traditionally trailed information sharing 
requirements, resulting in an environment that is now exploitable by cyber attackers and 
malware [3]. As society’s dependency on the Internet grows, so do the hazards associated 
with its use. Cyber threats continue to grow and evolve in complexity and scale. These 
attacks can originate from numerous sources including other nation-states, non-state 
actors, criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and even unaffiliated individuals. They 
present a credible and dangerous risk to U.S. information and communication  
networks [4]. Daily attacks number in the thousands [4] and constantly bombard and 
stress defensive measures [5]. 
Cybersecurity greatly benefits from routine and frequent log analysis by 
identifying malicious activity, violations, and problems [6]. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) describes the problem of balancing an organization’s 
ability to analyze logs with the continuous generation of log data as a “fundamental 
problem” in cyber defense [6]. Human-labor-intensive log analysis cannot keep pace with 
the number of attacks committed against United States Government (USG) and DOD 
networks. Numerous cyber events are logged daily by cybersecurity software, intrusion 
detection and prevention systems, network and end devices, and firewalls [6]. These logs 
must be filtered, analyzed, and acted upon as near to real-time as possible to limit impact 
of any cyber attack [7].  
The Reactive Aggregate Model Protecting Against Real-Time Threats 
(RAMPART) system was designed to determine if an intrusion met a network 
administrator-defined attack criteria and if it automates any specific responses per the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of a defending organization. RAMPART was 




RAMPART supports cybersecurity by merging decision-making frameworks and cyber 
defense strategies; see Appendix C. 
B. STATE OF CYBER DEFENSE 
Firewalls, anti-virus software, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and Intrusion 
Protection System (IPS) all contribute to the current state of cyber defenses. Their 
combined effects give a layered defense to computer networks. From each of these cyber 
defense system components, operators collect logs of the recorded events triggered by 
their systems as suspicious and possibly malicious activity. However, cyber attacks are 
rarely discovered using a single log [6], but rather through the aggregation of one or more 
logs. Discovering an attack is difficult because a majority of cyber defense components 
create thousands of pages of logs daily [6]. 
Conducting log analysis is problematic, partly because the type of log storage and 
varying log formats. Optimal configuration of the network can force cyber defense 
components to deliver their logs to a shared or distributed location [7]. However, 
configuring the network in this way adds more complexity to an already complex 
network. Information is stored in different orders, formats, and types. Because the 
formats and locations of the logs vary, the operator’s analysis is more difficult. 
Substantial time and effort is required of an operator to monitor, understand, and process 
logs while looking for often hard-to-spot details indicating an attack [6]. 
Commercial cybersecurity solutions exist on the market but are often more 
complex, expensive, and resource-intensive [6]. Often referred to as Security Information 
Management (SIM), Security Event Management (SEM), or Security Information and 
Event Management (SIEM) systems, these commercial cybersecurity solutions offer 
organizations the ability to aggregate data, correlate common attributes, and link user-
friendly tools to create a graphic user interface (GUI) or dashboard for easy access and 
management [8]. Purpose-built ‘fraud detection mechanisms’ are responsible for 5 
percent of all detections of intrusions against larger organizations, just behind the 8 




worse at identifying cyber threats than ad-hoc log analysis [9]. Current solutions do not 
adequately address the problem. A dynamically configurable, extensible, and scalable 
cybersecurity model is needed to protect an organization’s network. 
C. VECTOR RELATIONAL DATA MODELING 
The team selected Vector Relational Data Modeling to assemble RAMPART 
because it provided a dynamic and adaptable approach to creating an information 
apparatus that describes and executes system behavior. VRDM allows for compatibility 
and interoperability of data objects between different and multiple systems. Moreover, 
this model supports an extensible, scalable, configurable, and reconfigurable architecture 
to grow a given System of Systems (SoS) ecosystem [10], [11], [12]. Specifically, 
VRDM enables the aggregation of disparate data and information as component objects 
from multiple sources, and the ability to invoke, arrange, and relate the data in a 
configured extensible system.  
VRDM assembles component objects within the GINA framework environment 
through a configured specification [13], [14], [15]. VRDM permits the interoperation of 
data and subsequent decisions and processes to be described “as a semantically-rigorous, 
executable description of domain-relevant, inter-connected information objects, and then 
maps the semantics of the resulting information objects to the unique semantics and 
syntax of the underlying systems. The resulting [model was] well described, extensible, 
and robust” [13]. Interoperability of systems, to include individual data elements 
contained in any given system, creates a capability more robust than basic interactions 
between systems as each individual data element in a component system within the SoS 
is interoperable and functional in any other component system [13]. Furthermore, the 
extensible and universally configurable model provides an environment to define and 
integrate data semantics, processing logic, and information resources within and across 
all system domains [13]. It is clear that the VRDM approach is extremely useful, to the 




VRDM has three distinct layers: visual, semantic, and source. The visual layer is a 
representation of source records that are displayed in a web form. The semantic layer is 
an intermediate layer where a normalized semantic model is assembled. The source layer 
of VRDM connects to the data, in database tables or data streams; see Figure 1.  
 
 X-Types have Elements, relationships between X-Types, an abstraction Figure 1. 
of a database table, are specified by Vectors. Collection Vector A, and 
Collection Vector B shown above, relate Elements (blue boxes). The arrows 
indicate a configured relationship. The source, semantic, and visual layers of 
the model are loosely coupled, from [1]. 
The semantic model translates and maps all data elements within the basic 
structure of the SoS. This basic structure or conceptual dimension characterizes the 
overall SoS behavior by defining concepts, relationships, action, and components of the 
model; within GINA these are known as X-Types, Vectors, Services, and Elements, 




components allowing independent changes to be made to the model or the data sources. 
The data source components are integrated by normalizing databases to be compatible 
with individual data formats. A syntactic translator, a component of the .NET 
architecture, transforms different data formats. This transformation enables all data 
elements to communicate within the GINA environment. 
Major communication protocols supported in GINA are TCP/IP, UDP, Web 
Services, ODBC/OLEDB, and serial communication; there is virtually no limit to number 
of protocols that could be supported within the VRDM information apparatus [16]. 
Furthermore, VRDM has implemented programmable and configurable objects to enable 
the complete configuration of an executable system. 
There are nine core objects for the three framework layers in VRDM [1], [17]: 
1. Connection: The Connection specifies the server IP address and 
source database name. 
2. Source: The Source object specifies the Connection and data 
source table. The source is like a window into the remote database 
table where columns can be accessed as Element objects. 
3. Column: The Column specifies the server database column 
specified by the Source object. 
4. X-Type: The X-Type is an abstraction of a database table. X-Types 
have Elements and Vectors associated with them. 
5. Element: The Element object is an abstraction of a column within a 
database table. 
6. Vector: The Vector object forms the relationships between 
Elements.  
7. Vector Reference: A Vector Reference is an Element assigned to a 
Vector that serves as a filter for values retrieved from an Element. 
8. Forms: The UI page that contain the information Windows.  
9. Window: The three types of Windows: Authority Window, 
Resource Window, and Collection Window. The Authority 
Window contains navigable Elements of context. The Resource 




selected in the Authority Window. The collection Window 
displays related records specified by a Collection Vector. 
All VRDM model objects are configured in the framework’s web browser based 
user interface (UI). This UI is a simple, forms based web expression that utilizes text 
fields, check boxes, and drop down tabs for assembling the information apparatus.  
VRDM leveraged with GINA’s multi-dimensional architecture provided the team 
a way to solve the complex and challenging problem of integration, interoperability, and 
information exchange. Moreover, to explore and employ powerful concepts and tools to 
build a working model demonstrating its viability and applicability to real world problem 
sets. 
D. SELECTED USE CASES 
Team RAMPART approached the project by first selecting representative use 
cases of the cyber threat domain and a Network Operations Center (NOC). The selected 
use cases are described below: 
1. PhpMyAdmin 
The phpMyAdmin cyber attack is a representative use case of the cyber threat 
domain. The project team chose the “phpMyAdmin” attack, CVE-2010-3055, as a use 
case because it is an effective attack against web servers at NPS and because it 
demonstrates the effectiveness of a VRDM executable information apparatus in the 
GINA framework as a cyber threat response solution. We chose this attack because it was 
continuously detected in the web logs of a honeypot Apache server that was created prior 
to RAMPART implementation. The attacks generally consisted of a brute force directory 
traversal scan that specifically attempted to access the setup.php file in the phpMyAdmin, 
that many times originated from an anonymous proxy. A brute force attack is trial-and-
error method to gather information it typically functions by making requests to a server 
using a set of predetermined values crafted by an attacker, and then analyzing the server’s 
response [18], [19]. A directory traversal is an Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 




view content external to the primary web server’s root directory where application data is 
located [20]. The phpMyAdmin attack is a combination of these attacks and represents a 
creditable attack from the cyber threat domain. 
2. Information Technology and Communications Services (ITACS) 
ITACS incorporates and executes the most current cyber defense practices, 
policies, and technology available to monitor and protect the NPS networks. Using a 
defense-in-depth approach, they have incorporated firewalls, anti-virus, IDS, IPS, and 
application-based defensive components to protect the system. ITACS also conducts 
routine log analysis to detect network attacks. They rely heavily on log analysis to detect 
phpMyAdmin attacks making it an applicable use case for our project. 
The operators at the NPS ITACS walked through five major phases in handling 
incidents. The five phases are identification, containment, neutralization, recovery, and 
assessment and documentation. Starting with the identification phase, operators identify 
the source, type, and effect of the attack on the affected system(s). They also examine 
symptoms of the attack and what services or servers the attack is affecting. Then, during 
the containment phase, operators take measures to contain the attack to prevent its spread 
to other systems on the network. Operators isolate the system in a localized way. 
Next, during the neutralization phase, operators wipe and reimage government-
owned client machines to neutralize and stop the attack. Since personally owned devices 
are not within the jurisdiction or purview of ITACS personnel, they provide users 
recommendations to remediate their machines e.g, wiping and re-imaging. Furthermore, 
the ITACS staff neutralizes and remediates servers coordinating with the system 
administrator. Afterwards, during the recovery phase, operators recover systems and 
return them to operation as soon as possible. Next, ITACS personnel methodically restore 
the systems from backups. Also, prior to returning the system to operation, they remove 
any license-limited tools and then systematically reconnect devices to the network. If a 




ITACS re-enables the user’s domain account and resets their password. Finally, ITACS 
re-enables remote connectivity via VPN, wireless, or dial-in. 
Last, during the assessment and documentation phase, operators thoroughly 
document the vulnerabilities that allowed the attack to be successful. By assessing and 
understanding the anatomy of the attack, layers of defenses and security procedures, 
ITACS personnel increase, modify as necessary, and enhance TTPs to prevent or mitigate 
future attacks. They conduct documentation during the course of the incident to capture 
coarse details. After the incident response, they conduct an incident debrief to corroborate 
and identify further details for the record. Then they review system configuration for 
vulnerabilities that permitted the attack to occur; they correct these vulnerabilities and 
deficiencies. Next, they update TTPs prevent similar future vulnerabilities and attacks. 
An IDS rule or rules are created to monitor and alert operators to specific network 
activity, particularly activity that signals an attack. An IDS rule is a specific network 
administrator defined criteria that when met could indicate an intrusion. NPS ITACS 





III. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. PROJECT APPROACH 
In order to mitigate the manpower-intensive burden of log analysis, the project 
team attempted to automate the repeated actions found in the human work of log analysis. 
Time constraints were the main driver for the selection of methodology. Team 
RAMPART had six months to implement a network resident information apparatus 
capable of standards-agnostic incorporation of information. The approach taken was to 
build a VRDM executable information apparatus with a weighted scoring system to 
characterize anomalous network behavior either as an attack or normal behavior. We 
created a honeypot web server to obtain attack data and found that attackers generally 
scanned the namespace of the server from an obfuscated IP address and attempted to 
invoke PHP Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) scripts in the phpMyAdmin program 
directory. 
We postulated that a component, semantic-based information apparatus utilizing a 
weighted scoring system may determine if a specified risk level necessitated an 
automated response. This model operated under the premise that single instances of 
network behavior are sometimes insufficient to classify the behavior, and that some 
events can be more suspect than others. An automated analysis of the threat level of a 
phpMyAdmin attack would demonstrate the viability of using a VRDM executable 
information model as an automated analysis tool. This proof-of-concept could then be 
applied to sophisticated attacks with larger decision sets requiring an advanced criterion 
to be defined and met. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW 
RAMPART is an implementation of a suspicion based intrusion detection 
information model created to demonstrate the concept of an intrusion detection and 
response model for network defense SoS [1]; see Appendix E. The component objects of 




model specification, the specified data objects, the sources of the specified data objects, 
and the executable software identified to be part of the system process. 
The information model implementation utilized distributed hardware, servers and 
software, and data elements, e.g., The Onion Router (Tor) watch list. We configured the 
Apache Web server to ingest data and process it in a manner similar to how a network 
administrator or an operator would do so to determine if an attack occurred. The model 
pulls database information, e.g., remote IP addresses, Uniform Resource Locators (URL), 
or page status from the Microsoft (MS) Structured Query Language (SQL) server 
containing the known Tor exit nodes and the MySQL server containing the Apache 
weblogs, and checks them against a criteria consisting of three indicators: 1.) a known 
Tor exit node, 2.) “phpMyAdmin” in the URL request, and 3.) “404” page not found 
status error. If two of the three indicators are met, then the model executes a response to 
block the possible attack through the Responder; see Figures 2 and 3. 
The phases of the information apparatus specification consist of ingesting data, 
scanning web logs for patterns that are suspicious, correlating the patterns relative to IP 
address, summing the suspect pattern matches, and generating a response when a 
threshold value is reached. The conceptual model is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
RAMPART employs two unique tables that act as a repository of tasks during continuous 
compare operations. The first table is a state table that maintains the unique identity of a 
web connection. The second table is an accumulator table where each suspect pattern is 
recorded as an identifiable attribute. Once the accumulator has an IP address record that 
has more than one suspect attribute, a special VRDM Form is invoked by a timed service 
procedure. The VRDM Form reads in the IP address of the suspect identity and forwards 
the IP address as a command line argument to a batch file. The batch file executes a Plink 





 RAMPART Conceptual Model. Each diamond is a VRDM decision that Figure 2. 
occurs in a parallel process and populates a special table (RAMPART 
Accumulator) with a binary result of each decision. The threat monitor sums 
the decision results and triggers the responder when any row decision sum is 
greater than one. The responder uses the IP address element to identify 
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 The SoS hypergraph shows the system components, data objects and Figure 3. 
network that interact with the GINA environment and are available to the 
information apparatus. The “Exit node pattern match” ellipse represents the 
portion of the VRDM information apparatus that specifies the interaction 
between a Microsoft Windows server and a Linux MySQL server. 
C. RAMPART INFORMATION MODEL DECISION CRITERIA 
The capstone project addresses three signatures indicative of our selected cyber 
attack use case: The phpMyAdmin attack. 
• “404” page not found status error in the web log database. 




• “phpMyAdmin” is in the URL  request. 
Any one of these alerts may not be indicative of an attack. However, blocking of 
an IP based on a single alert criterion is impractical, as it would lead rapidly to a Denial 
of Service (DoS) to legitimate users. Combinations of any two of the indicators provide a 
more robust trigger for identifying malicious phpMyAdmin attacks from genuine users. 
RAMPART requires two out of the three indicators to be met in order to classify as an 
attack and warrant a response. 
“404” page not found status error 
The decision-making criteria for declaring an IP as a source of a malicious attack 
is based on input from ITACS operations and refined through server log analysis. From 
the log analysis, we determined that two “404” page not found status errors from the 
same IP address that occur within a two second window was sufficient to infer that 
malicious scanning was in progress. The “404” page not found status errors alone would 
yield too many false positive malicious activity, since the error can occur as a result of an 
unintentional activity, e.g., a typing error by the user.  
Known Tor Nodes  
RAMPART maintains a list of all known Tor exit nodes. It compares the 
embedded Tor exit node list against the source IP of the web request. If a match is found, 
the information apparatus increments the accumulator by one. Blocking all Tor users 
would prevent the legitimate users as well as the potential attackers. RAMPART must 
have a means to distinguish legitimate users from the attackers. 
phpMyAdmin 
A typical phpMyAdmin attack includes “phpMyAdmin” or similar syntax in the 
URL of the web request. However, legitimate use of “phpMyAdmin” may also occur 
especially by network administrators throughout their daily tasks. Consequently, you do 




characterize the legitimate users from the attackers. Combining this indication with one 
of the other indicators can reveal a user’s intentions, i.e., hostile or not. 
D. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
Implementation of the model required training on key concepts of database 
management, Linux configuration, Apache web server configuration, router 
configuration, network hardware, and server hardware configuration prior to integration 
with VRDM. The RAMPART model implementation required training on the GINA 
framework for the capstone project team from Big Kahuna Technologies, the owner of 
the software patent for GINA. Training consisted both of on-site UI usage, and distance 
tech support for model configuration and implementation; approximately ten one-on-one 
sessions each five hours in duration. The last two training sessions configured the 
RAMPART model in less than ten hours. No programming was required with the 
exception of a batch script file that relayed a blocked IP address command to the router. 
E. PHYSICAL SYSTEM BUILD 
1. Original System Specifications and Changes 
In the design phase of the RAMPART prototype, the team planned for physical 
and configuration challenges to ensure our build would be architecturally scalable, 
flexible, and compatible across disparate platform systems. The design began with ten 
Dell 1950 PowerEdge blade servers with dual quad core 2.66 gigahertz (GHz) processors 
and 16 gigabytes (GB) of Random Access Memory (RAM) that was upgraded from the 
original 8 GB. We also installed two 300 GB hard drives in each system with Redundant 
Array of Independent Disks (RAID) 0 configurations in each of the database servers. 
Each system came with two gigabit (Gb) Network Interface Controllers (NIC) built-in. 
One additional NIC was added to three of the servers to allow for a connection to 
multiple networks and the ability to separate and localize Internet traffic from the internal 




2. System Repairs 
Each of the servers had multiple hardware issues, e.g., inadequate cooling, hard 
drive controller cards with blown capacitors, or damaged cabling. Once a given problem 
was corrected, other problems arose that required corrective action. Power management 
was another issue, as power in the office was not sufficient to run all of the servers 
simultaneously. These power issues hindered the team’s ability to keep all systems at full 
capacity. The power issue was resolved by transferring the servers to an ideal lab 
location. Once all hardware and configuration issues were corrected, the servers were left 
powered on to ensure uninterrupted and stable operation. 
3. Hardware Layout 
Switch (Brocade and Cisco) 
Original configuration utilized a 24 port Brocade switch that was configured with 
three Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN) for the Internet, internal network, and a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ). Upon setup and implementation, the switch validated 
connections with all computers connected to the network and the Internet, however it 
would not route any traffic between the systems or traffic out to the Internet. While 
troubleshooting the switch, the team eventually had to clear all the configuration settings 
and restart with a fresh installation. Rebuilding the switch and separating the networks 
again, yielded no change in the connectivity between the systems. Also while 
troubleshooting the switch; the team discovered a hardware problem that was beyond the 
teams’ capability to repair. The team procured a 24-port Cisco switch from a point of 
contact at NPS and once installed, experienced no additional switching issues for the 
remainder of the system build.  
IP Schema and Connectivity 
The team used various Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and subnets to separate the 
networks into three subnets to minimize the chance of internal network traffic causing 
false positives during the testing phase, and to enhance security through the use of 




172.16.0.0/25, the Internet VLAN was 10.0.0.0/25, and the database servers were directly 
connected to the servers on 192.168.0.0/30 networks that the logs were originating from. 
The Internet was set up to route via the Ubuntu operating system (OS) using IPTables to 
control access and allow for the remote updating from the GINA service. 
4. Operating System Selection 
The team started with systems that were fully accredited for military use. The 
team experimented with different system configurations, including several different OS’ 
to create an optimum working environment per our design.  
Windows 2008 Server R2 Enterprise 
The Windows 2008 servers were used in enterprise mode as both a database 
server and an Internet Information Services (IIS) server for the GINA framework. The 
team installed the Windows OS using default system settings. The installation of software 
required to establish communication channels between the nodes, e.g., the Open Database 
Connectivity (ODBC) connection is provided below under the software section. 
Red Hat/Community Enterprise operating System 
Red Hat 6.5 Enterprise was also selected since it is an accredited system. Initially, 
Red Hat was used to demonstrate the configurability of the information apparatus. The 
Apache server was initially implemented on Red Hat but required changing over to 
Community Enterprise Operating System (CentOS) because switching to CentOS 6.5 
allowed for unrestricted installation of phpMyAdmin and all required dependencies with 
minimal errors. The second Linux server was installed with Red Hat and MySQL for the 
logging of the Apache web server access logs. Installation of MySQL and MySQL 
workbench for database administration was straightforward and required no additional 
external repositories.  
5. Router and Trigger Mechanism 
The trigger mechanism was an essential component of the RAMPART model. 




containing a phpMyAdmin attack. The team started with a Vyatta router OS supplied by 
NPS but modified the system to use Ubuntu with IPTables. The initial requirements for 
the trigger were the following: 
• Single line of code executable on the command line interface (CLI). 
• Command execution would cause a configuration change to the router. 
The team encountered challenges creating and incorporating the trigger 
mechanism. The first challenge was that the GINA framework uses a Windows-based OS 
while the router used a Debian Linux based OS. The team decided to use the SSH 
protocol to remotely configure the router. SSH is a network protocol that connects two 
networked computers via a protected channel and enables secure data communication and 
other network services. Though the protocol was easily identified, a test bed was 
designed and implemented to test and develop the trigger. Two networked virtual 
machines (VM) were created to serve as the test bed for creating and testing the trigger. 
The next challenge was to find a SSH-capable program that could be executed on a 
Windows OS to SSH remotely into a Linux based OS. 
Three options were possible. One option used a program called Plink, which is a 
CLI of the open-source terminal emulator, Putty. In a CLI, a user types commands to the 
program in consecutive lines of text. Putty supports numerous network protocols 
including SSH. It was originally created for Windows-based OSes [21]. Using Plink, we 
could create a SSH connection to the router. The second option was Cygwin. Cygwin 
creates a Unix-like environment and CLI on Windows OSes [22]. It integrates Windows 
applications to tools and data in its Unix-like environment. The third and final option was 
to use the protocol called “Expect.” This surprisingly flexible and powerful tool allowed 
a command to be executed and the expected return to be anticipated and answered. 
Expect has a test terminal interface and automates interactive applications using common 
protocols such as telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), SSH, and others [23]. 
Initial testing and research explored the capabilities and responses of Plink. 




executing configuration changes was difficult. Plink was designed for executing 
commands on another server and not a router. Cygwin did not readily have the command 
line execution required by GINA. The team’s first success of executing configuration 
changes on the router was using Expect. Though verbose, Expect allowed for the 
unexpected responses from the router since one could program the anticipated responses. 
The difficulty was in creating a single command executable by GINA. The tested 
functional version of Expect was Cygwin-based, therefore the team returned to testing 
with Plink. 
Adding to the difficulty of finding a remote SSH-capable command line program 
was the fact that Vyatta was bought by Brocade. Brocade removed the forums containing 
years of Vyatta user information. A new forum was started at Brocade’s site, but the old 
forums never reappeared. Also, originally Vyatta was an open source router. After 
Brocade’s purchase, it was changed to licensed software. The team had used a 60-day 
trial version of Vyatta but the trial period ran out during the creation of the hardware 
server test bed. This led to the team dropping its use and implementing an Ubuntu server 
using IPTables. This allowed the server to work in the role of a router, fulfilling our 
requirements. 
Because team members had minimal experience in managing routers, a simple 
setup was desirable for updating the system and the IPTables to block harmful packets or 
requests. The team learned how to update and configure IPTables remotely. This allowed 
testing without compromising the servers’ integrity. The team set up and configured the 
new router utilizing Ubuntu 14 Long Term Support (LTS) and the IPTables located in the 
/etc folder of the system. 
The change to an Ubuntu server allowed the team to return to using Plink as 
originally intended. Plink gave the team a command line execution interface usable by 
the information apparatus as a Windows OS application. The VRDM information  
apparatus executes a batch file, running a Plink SSH command to remotely change the 
configuration of the IPTable routing on the Ubuntu server. This is the implementation of 





The Plink program allowed remote SSH login and command execution to update 
the router. The following lines were the result of the research and testing combined to 
create the batch file used by the information apparatus to execute the remote update to the 
Ubuntu router of the RAMPART system. The lines of code are as follows:  
Line 1: echo attempt %1 %date% %time% >> c:\temp\
testresultkelly.txt 
Line 2: %1. c:\temp\plink.exe -ssh -P 222 root@207.140.106.46 
-pw rampart123!@# iptables -I FORWARD 1 -s %1 -j DROP 
Line 3: echo success %1 %date% %time% >> c:\temp\
testresultkelly.txt 
The first and third lines write the attacking IP address to a text file only for the purpose of 
generating a visual record of the IP address and the time of the attack for testing and 
evaluation of the system. The second line invokes the Plink command to SSH into the 
router remotely and updates the IPTables to drop the attacking IP address which is passed 
to the router through the variable. 
6. Software Install 
MS SQL (SQL Management Console) 
The GINA framework operates primarily on Windows systems, though it is 
capable of communicating with Linux/UNIX. Utilizing MS SQL as the primary database 
we installed and configured the SQL Management console for easier administration of 
the various databases used in the information apparatus. Regarding ease of 
administration, the SQL Management console, once configured, facilitates remote 
administration of the databases that allows the network administrator to concentrate on 
other tasks.   
Figure 4 shows the constituent databases and associated X-Types for the Apache 




command line responses. The red ellipses in the figure illustrate Element comparison 
operations invoked by GINA Services. The X-Types are arranged in the logical 
progression of collection, detection, and response. 
 
 
 This figure shows the salient portions of the RAMPART databases and Figure 4. 
X-Types. The TestCommandLine X-Type has a dotted line around it 
because no physical source existed for the X-Type. The TestCommandLine 
X-Type only executed the ExecuteCommand service for each new Element. 
The red circles show where information is combined to make a deduction 
about the validity of a connection. Each database is shown with all tables 










After installation and setup of the Apache web server, we shifted the Apache logs 
from a standard file into a database. This allowed RAMPART access to the Apache logs; 
the logs are required to be in a database that is readable by the configurable information 
apparatus. Based on the information needed from the Apache logs the add-on module of 
mod_log_sql was initially chosen and implemented. As development of the model 
continued, we found that required information was not supported by mod_log_sql and 
another module was required. We decided to use the plugin module mod_log_dbd that 
was designed to use any of the log variables of Apache. The team configured the module. 
The httpd.conf file located in the /etc/httpd/conf directory must have the table name, 
column names, along with the username and password for the database with exact 
spelling and case or the connection will not be made and data will not be logged. Once 
the configuration was correct, data seamlessly flowed into the database. As testing began, 
the team also attempted to install and configure phpMyAdmin, the main attack vector of 
our testing. 
PhpMyAdmin 
PhpMyAdmin is available through various repositories and requires certain 
program dependencies. Red Hat requires a subscription and the ability to change the 
repositories you are subscribed to. Since the team did not have access to modify the Red 
Hat repositories, the system was switched to the more open CentOS 6.5. The exact 
repositories needed and the configuration are detailed in Appendix F.  
MySQL (Workbench) 
To allow ease of management of the web server logs in the database, a MySQL 
workbench was installed on both Linux and Windows servers. These allowed remote 




ODBC / Visual C++ 
An ODBC plugin is required to convert a MySQL database to a MS SQL 
database. Since the GINA framework runs on MS SQL the ODBC plugin was needed to 
pull in the Apache Logs from MySQL. ODBC connections have specific prerequisite 
requirements to allow proper operation such as the Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package 
and the current Microsoft Data Access Components. Once installed and configured, a 
valid connection was made to the remote Apache database and the RAMPARTread in the 
Apache access logs. The logs were inputs to the RAMPART model.  
IIS 
The GINA framework is web based program for modeling database aggregation, 
decision-making and system behavior based. The configuration that controls the behavior 
is specified by the user in a web interface. The constituent components are Microsoft IIS 
server, MS SQL and DotNetNuke. At startup, the proprietary kernel creates a closed 
environment that may be accessed and managed through a web browser. The resulting 
VRDM environment is unique in that the programming actions are objects therefore; the 
entire semantically based information apparatus is configured [13]. 
System Updates and Linux Repositories 
The servers initially were not updated automatically. However, after the test VM 
system was breached by an outside attacker, the physical system settings were changed to 
allow the automatic install of updates. The Red Hat and CentOS required specific 
programs and services dependencies to be installed before certain programs would 
function properly. Some of these can be installed during system installation but others 
require access to a particular repository before installation can occur. For a complete list 







Each Windows server had remote desktop enabled to allow remote 
administration. Each system was assigned a specific port and a rule was added to the 
IPTables in the router to forward the traffic for that port to the specific computer. This 
required changing the Windows configuration default listening port. The registry key of 
the Remote Desktop Connection (RDC) had to be modified. The path below is the exact 
registry key location: 
“HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\TerminalServer\
WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber” [24]. 
Each user must also be in the remote desktop users group before being allowed to 
connect from another machine. 
Secure Shell  
SSH was enabled and ports adjusted to allow multiple machines to have SSH 
connections through the router for remotely making configuration changes. Each 
machine’s port was added to the IPTable of the router to forward any request on the 
specified SSH port, for example port 22, to the associated server for remote 
administration. 
Model Components, Relations and Interactions 
RAMPART used data from a Linux MySQL database and a MSSQL database; 
see Figures 5 and 6. Each column was integrated into the modeling environment as 
elements of six X-Types. These X-Types were Apache_log, Accumulator, BlockState, 
Epoch, Signatures, Weight, and TestCommandLine. All test data originated from the 
Apache_log X-Type and was manipulated according to values in the Signatures and 
Weight X-types. The TestCommandLine X-Type controlled the GINA service that 





 This image shows a MySQL database on a Linux server. Records were Figure 5. 
populated from events on an Apache web server. There was a single table 
“apache_log” in the Apache database. Each event generated in the system 
log was parsed by “mod-log-dbd” and written to the database by “apr-dbd.” 
The relevant columns were Tsp, RemoteIP, Status, URL, and Epoch. 
 
 This image shows the “central processing unit” of the RAMPART Figure 6. 
model. The RAMPART database exists on a Windows SQL server and has 
four tables: Accumulator, BlockState, Epoc, Signature, and Weight. 
Accumulator columns were RemoteIP, Test1, Test2, Test3 and Time. The 
values of each test were updated using VRDM transforms. The BlockState 
table maintained a list of each IP address that was blocked and when the 
block occurred. The Epoc table was a pivot necessary to convert the time 
stamps to Epoch time format. The Signature table held values indicative of a 





The Accumulator is a special X-Type that serves as RAMPART’s “memory” of 
the results of each multi-part test; see Figure 7. RAMPART validated a phpMyAdmin 
web request by testing additional characteristics of the request namely, obfuscation and 
scanning activity. A Transform updated the Test values when test conditions were met. 
Function Elements were used to sum the results of the Test values based on the weight of 
each test. In the phpMyAdmin use case, all weights were equal but larger models 
required variable test weights to better emulate the human decision-making process. 
 
 
 The image shows the Accumulator X-Type Element. The X-Type Figure 7. 
Elements consisted of Persistent Elements (field numbers that do not include 
99), Vector Elements (field number 999), Reference Elements (field number 
9999), and Function Elements (field number 99999). This Element, 





Services are the “workers” of the RAMPART model. They execute commands 
and other services when certain conditions were met. The services for the Accumulator 
X-Type were assigned Transforms in order to modify values in Elements; see Figure 8. 
 
  The Accumulator X-Type services are shown at the top left of the image Figure 8. 
above. Each service was controlled by a transform that modified the value of 
the Flag Elements by using the calculation results from Function Elements.  
 
Each test condition was assigned a service that “flagged” when Elements failed a 
validation test. RAMPART used Test1 to determine if phpMyAdmin existed in the URL 
Element of the Apache X-Type and an affirmative executed the Flag1 service. Test2 
determined if two or more “404” page not found existed in the Status Element, the 
Timestamp Elements were two or fewer seconds apart, and the URL Element values were 
not equal; if all were true, the Flag2 Service was invoked. Test3 determined if the 
RemoteIP Element matched any value in the Tor_IP_Exit X-Type Element IP; if a match 
occurred, the Flag3 Service was invoked. Each of the Services generated results as they 





 This image shows the Accumulator records and the calculated total of Figure 9. 
the results of each test. Test totals greater than one indicated a threat. Test 
result totals of one or zero indicated no threat. This is an example of how a 
signature match can be evaluated under certain conditions to limit the 
number of false positives. The Total Element in the righost column 
contained summations of Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3. This sum was compared 





If any Total Element value was equal to two or three, a Transform copied the 
value in the RemoteIP Element to the Blockstate X-Type. Each new Element in the 
BlockState X-Type called an ExecuteCommand Service; see Figure 10. 
 
 The Blockstate X-Type was appended to the RemoteIP Element of an Figure 10. 
Accumulator record that reached a row test sum of two. The 
ExecuteCommand Service was called for each new row in the Blockstate X-
Type. The ExecuteCommand Service used the RemoteIP Element as a 
command line argument when each command was executed. Multiple 
arguments could be configured to be sent to a shell command. 
 
The ExecuteCommand Service executed a shell command that was defined as a 
Connection; see Figure 11. The RemoteIP Element was the command line argument in 
this case. Additional command line argument Elements could be configured in the 
RAMPART model as necessary. The runCommand.bat file contained a simple two line 
SSH command invoked by the Plink SSH interpreter. The runCommand.bat file 
contained: 
Line 1: c:\temp\plink.exe -ssh -P 222 root@10.0.0.1 -pw 
rampart123!@# ./blockAndRemove.sh%1 




The script blockAndRemove.sh was located on the router device and served as a 
timer to unblock a connection after seven minutes. The second line outputted a log 
containing the time and IP address of each blocked connection. 
 
 The ExecuteCommand Service invoked the runCommand.bat Figure 11. 
Connection. The Connection shown is the file name and location of a shell 
command. Each different command was required to have a unique 
Connection.  
 
RAMPART used a batch file that called Plink (an SSH interpreter) to send SSH 
commands to any SSH compatible device.   
Working Model Implementation 
The original design of the RAMPART system called for a nine-computer system that 
would detect various types of attacks. Additionally, the System used a decision tree with 
multiple tests to determine if the inbound packet was a threat from: a Tor type network 
exit node by the inbound IP address and/or the remote port of the request and verifying 
them against the know Tor exit nodes and ports commonly used. To complete these tasks 
the system was built using the nine computers connected through a switch. Each system 
was designed with a specific task in mind then the systems were networked together in 




database machines to log traffic from the Apache web server and to run the GINA server. 
Figure 12 is a pictorial representation of the original system.  
 
 Conceptualized Hardware Configuration for RAMPART. The system Figure 12. 
was comprised of 9 servers separated into 3 VLANS to segregate network 
traffic. The red lines indicate the direct connection between databases. 
The system was simplified due to time constraints and system issues. To simplify 
the model the team restructured the Tor detection section and removed the mapping 
section along with the Snort and strictly focused efforts on the phpMyAdmin attacks and 
the known Tor exit nodes. To accomplish this, we removed various sections of the model 
and lowered the required servers from nine to five computers plus the switch to allow for 
sectioning off the networks. The overall design of the system did not change but the team  
reduced the systems required for running specific portions of the information apparatus. 




server and the GINA database servers and aggregated the information to run the tests 
against the criteria set forth in the information apparatus. The team created a prototype 
SoS out of five servers and a switch shown in Figure 13. 
 
 RAMPART hardware configuration. The final phpMyAdmin attack test Figure 13. 





























IV. TESTS AND RESULTS 
A. TEST PLAN 
RAMPART was designed as a system of systems that relies on the underlying 
functionality of three core components. 
• MS SQL server 2008 backend database. 
• Microsoft IIS running on Windows server 2008. 
• DotNetNuke – an open source web content management system. 
RAMPART used GINA as a database integration tool to integrate data sources 
from remote services. The capstone tested a Linux-based Apache web server with the 
following software implementations: 
• MySQL as a Linux-based backend server for web applications. 
• Mod-DBD as a parser of logs. 
• APR_DBD driver as a database connector. 
• PhpMyAdmin as a web based database administration tool. 
Data pulled from a Microsoft IIS server represented the test network flow of 
information; see Figure 14. 
 
 Above, the logical flow of data in RAMPART is shown. The test was Figure 14. 





The project team exposed the Apache web server as a honeypot. Firewalls were 
disabled and the password was a common dictionary password. Possibility existed for 
malicious compromise. 
1. Assumptions 
• GINA could connect to a backend MS SQL database through proper 
configuration of DotNetNuke. 
• GINA had access to Apache log database and table. 
• Apache web server could log connection information to the backend 
MySQL database. 
• Logging occurred in real-time. 
 
2. Tested Features 
(1) Database connection testing entailed the creation of VRDM sources 
mapped to columns in an Apache web log database. When complete and accurate data 
filled the GINA environment, the system had a successful connection. 
(2) Performance testing entailed steadily increasing the amount of traffic to 
the web server until RAMPART became overwhelmed. Analysis of missed positives per 
total number of expected positives defined the hit rate at a given traffic level. 
(3) Usability testing was to determine whether RAMPART analysis could be 
initiated without additional configuration and is completely automated. Recovery from a 
system failure should require nothing more than a system restart. The user interface must 
be capable of rendering decision data with relatively few clicks on a simple user 
interface. 
(4) The percentage of true positives, false positives, and false negatives 
determined the accuracy of the system in a set of web requests. True positives occur 
when the system performed as expected. False positives occurred when RAMPART 




RAMPART either missed a threat signature or did not detect all elements of threat 
triggers. 
3. Approach 
RAMPART testing began with a basic operability test of the user interface. 
Verification of RAMPART operation occurred before proceeding to tests of true positive 
detection and false positive detection. Team RAMPART determined the presence of the 
data and the accessibility of the data within a few clicks in a GUI. The test concluded 
with verification that a response occurred which resulted in a router update that blocked 
traffic from the IP address that related to the positive detection. 
The test demonstrated the functionality of collection, detection, and response. 
Collection 
• We connected to the GINA user interface and determined if data from an 
Apache server was read into the framework. 
• The data was visually confirmed to be accurate and complete. 
Detection 
• Connected to non-phpMyAdmin content from a Tor browser and scanned 
random URLs on the Apache server at the same time. 
• Accessed phpMyAdmin using a Tor browser at the same time. 
• Scanned phpMyAdmin URLs using a non-obfuscated browser. 
• Accessed phpMyAdmin not using a Tor browser. 
• Connected to non-phpMyAdmin content using a non-obfuscated browser. 
Response 
• Confirmed that the IPTable on the router updated to block the IP address 
of a threat. 
• Time of response. 




• Connection the phpMyAdmin site defined by any variant of 
“phpMyAdmin” string in the URL element. 
• The presence of URL traversal scanning defined by at least two “404” 
page not found status elements within two seconds from the same IP 
address. 
• A source IP address that matched an IP address on of a list of known Tor 
addresses. 
 
Criteria Grading Matrix: Two or more indicators constitutes a threat 
phpMyAdmin X X X  X    
Scanning X X  X  X   
Obfuscation X  X X   X  







Table 1.   The RAMPART weighted flag truth table is shown above. Any 
two or more alerts indicated by an “X” result in a threat trigger. Each 
column indicates a possible test (t1…tn) and outcome is tallied at the 
bottom. 
 
The test had two phases. The first phase determined if RAMPART worked and 





4. Pass/Fail Criteria 
Test 1: 
• Speed of detection must be within seven minutes of the suspected 
malicious event. 
• Threat detection must result in an updated router IPTable. 
• Results must have a 95% true positive hit rate and a 5% false negative hit 
rate. 
• There must be less than 1% false positive hit rate. 
• Data analysis of processed information can be accessed with no more 
than three clicks of a mouse in the RAMPART web interface. 
Test 2: 
Test 2 is similar to Test 1, but included a traffic analysis of events per 
second. It determined the number of events per second necessary to 
overwhelm RAMPART. Test 2 functioned as a stress test for RAMPART. 
 
B. TESTS 
This section describes a functional test of the usability of RAMPART and the 
functionality of a weighted decision model. 
Testing supported the following objectives: 
• Non-programming aspect of RAMPART as an Intrusion Detection 
System in a modeling environment. 
• Effectiveness of RAMPART as an IDS model with active response. 
• Effectiveness of RAMPART under a stress test. 
 
C. RESULTS 
Phase one testing took place over a period of ten days and consisted of running 




1. Test 1: Detection Rates 
During phase one testing, the team encountered a few errors in the response of the 
RAMPART system. When confronted with a Tor based phpMyAdmin request, 
RAMPART flagged the request and attempted to block the IP address at the router. 
Though it was attempting to run the batch file, RAMPART did not invoke the command 
to block the IP. The team found that the GINA system was attempting to run the 
command from the folder C:\windows\system32 location which did not contain the 
correct executable file. The figure below is a portion of the GINA log file showing GINA 
attempting to run the command in the batch file; see Figure 15. 
 
 Log file output of the GINA program calling the batch file to execute the Figure 15. 
update to the router 
A modification of the batch file explicitly telling the program to run the file in 
C:\temp location corrected the issue and enabled RAMPART to correctly call the file. 
Then RAMPART blocked the IP address from the Tor network within seven minutes of 
the initial request for the phpMyAdmin page on the Apache server. When compared with 
the Tor exit node list embedded in the GINA database, results revealed a 95% detection 
rate with a 5% miss rate for the system. The system was also set up to detect and respond 
to a “404” page not found status error from the Apache server if the source originated 
from a Tor-based IP address. Again, RAMPART detected and blocked the threat within 
the required seven minute timeframe and updated the router to thwart the attacker. The 
third requirement of the system was to detect and respond to a scan of the Apache server 
for phpMyAdmin access from a non-Tor IP address. A scan such as this would generate 




combined with a “404” page not found status response. The team attempted to access the 
server with an incorrect phpMyAdmin URL generating a “404” page not found status 
error and elicited RAMPART to block the IP. The system responded within seven 
minutes, blocking the IP and added it to the FORWARD section of the router’s IP tables 
to drop any further requests from that IP address for the next four minutes. 
The majority of the testing was completed from 28 August to 1 September. The 
last day RAMPART was flooded with over 37,000 events in about one hour, both valid 
and threat-based, to test the response time of the system and its capacity to handle large 
amounts of requests at once. Multiple VMs and a MACRO recording program were used 
to allow for automated testing of the system. Upon manual evaluation of the threat 
packets, we found that 2300 packets met threat criteria and invoked a response from 
RAMPART. After removing the duplicate IPs, 256 unique threats were isolated upon 
detection by the system. To resolve the exact response times, each initial request time 
was correlated to the first response time sent to the router for blocking. The delta between 
the times was calculated and then plotted on the graph below; see Figure 16. 
 
 
 Plot of individual attacks numbered along the X axis with the time of Figure 16. 
response by RAMPART for the attack along the Y axis. The average 
RAMPART response time was just over six minutes. The average response 
time was calculated based on the total response time of all the attacks and 
the number of attacks for the given period of testing. The standard deviation 




The average response time for RAMPART was calculated based on the total 
response time of all the attacks and the number of attacks for the given period of testing. 
Overall, there were 256 threats processed by the system with a total response time of 
1638.33 minutes for an average 6.39 minutes per event. Based on review of the data the 
high marks of 12 minutes were found to be IP addresses that just missed the previous 
database scan iteration of 6 minutes per model design, but were caught by the next scan 
and then blocked. The responses that were under the average were found to have been 
caught by the database scan just as it was finishing the first iteration. One way to draw 
the time closer together would be to increase the database scan rate from every six 
minutes to every three minutes for a full scan by limiting the amount of data that the 
system has to digest. Though the system did not achieve 100% detection on all attacks, 
RAMPART  did detect and respond to most threats within seven minutes. 
2. Test 1: Verification Tests 
The team conducted several iterations of Test 1 to verify results. After clearing 
the table in the database we conducted additional test cycles, RAMPART was hit with 
over 1500 requests for various IP addresses consisting of 28 valid IP addresses. 
Legitimate, non-malicious IPs were set and expected to not trigger the system unless it 
faulted; conversely, the 134 attacking addresses were expected to be detected as 
intrusions and invoke responses. We found that, with a clear table, RAMPART 







 Chart depicting RAMPART’s 100% successful detection and response Figure 17. 
to URL invoked requests. RAMPART permitted the 28 valid IP addresses to 
pass, and denied the 134 phpMyAdmin IPs. 
 
3. Test 2: Stress Test 
Team RAMPART conducted a system stress test of the RAMPART model 
utilizing multiple VMs with Easy Macro recorder installed to record and reproduce 
website hits in an organized fashion. A total of fifteen machines were built and setup to 
conduct the test. Six of the systems were set to connect through a Tor browser and 
automatically logged in and browsed the php database. This generated positive hits and 
triggered a response, while the rest just browsed the site as authorized users. Over four 
hours, these systems produced webpage requests and traffic to test RAMPART’s ability 
to differentiate between an attacking IP address and a valid request. The system 
performed as expected. RAMPART updated the router to block the suspect IP addresses 
for a preset amount of time of four minutes. After approximately 49,000 to 50,000 rows 




limit and timed out in its search through the Apache web logs and allowed all traffic 
through; see Figure 18. 
 
 Apache table information displaying the total number of rows in the Figure 18. 
table at approximately 52,000 entries or rows before the timeout occurs. 
After the Apache web logs reached approximately 52,000 entries or rows, the queries 
would timeout on the database scans and allow all traffic through to the server. The fault 
lies in the information apparatus’ ability to parse through all the logs on the Apache SQL 
server in the preset amount time of three minutes, one half of the full scan time, and find 
the new attacks. This inability to parse the log could lead to a DoS attack to flood the 
server with requests filling the log and causing it to not block valid threats entering the 
system. This would leave the system vulnerable to a more sophisticated attack after 
RAMPART falters. Though a typical system would not encounter a hit rate of 50,000 
rows in the amount of time that RAMPART encountered them, the test provides a 







A. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
The system was designed to demonstrate that a weighted decision model is possible as a 
matter of configuration. RAMPART was the realization of the concept and created as a 
configuration. Common intrusion detection software such as Snort is known to provide 
automated response using software plugins such as SnortSAM and FWSnort. These 
programs use either an agent installed on the gateway device or intentionally flood the 
source or destination sockets with reset packets as methods of active response. 
Furthermore, Snort_Inline is a program that provides intrusion prevention functionality 
by converting a Snort server into an inline device. There are problems with each of these 
methods. Not all gateway devices capable of hosting agent software for SnortSAM, 
FWSnort reset packets can be blocked at the remote firewall, and Snort_Inline is 
vulnerable to a denial of service attack from programs like “Stick” that can send false 
positives for every address in the IPv4 address space. Cisco products such as Auto Secure 
and Adaptive Security Appliance are effective for Cisco products, but large distributed 
networks may not always have only Cisco products. The Federal Acquisitions 
Streamlining act provides for fair vendor competition and can induce a mix of proprietary 
products in large Federal networks that may not all be compatible with Cisco Auto 
Secure. RAMPART used configurable SSH commands to remotely reconfigure any SSH 
capable network device to overcome these limitations. There are also Snort preprocessors 
capable of creating decision trees that specifically perform the same multi-criteria 
decision tasks employed in the phpMyAdmin use case RAMPART model; however, 
programming specific preprocessors to perform this task is complex and the process is 
not conducive to the rapid reconfiguration needed for detecting new threats. RAMPART 
overcomes this limitation by introducing a decision as a modular object that can be 





Test 1 results demonstrated RAMPART’s ability to detect and respond to 
phpMyAdmin attacks within an average time of seven minutes. As designed, results 
indicated a 95 percent true positive hit rate. The project’s automated log analysis 
capability can reduce the time it takes organizations to detect cyber attacks from days or 
months to seven to twelve minutes. Decreasing the time required to detect an intrusion is 
a significant achievement that enhances an organizations’ internal cyber attack detection 
capability. RAMPART’s ability to provide an automatic response to halt attacks by 
reconfiguring the routing service also greatly improves an organization’s ability to 
weather cyber attacks effectively. Even before a breach can occur, the automated 
response from RAMPART can stop the attack. Instead of days or even months containing 
an intrusion, the attack is halted before it can penetrate the network perimeter of the 
organization. This capability also has the extra benefit of avoiding the possibility of 
critical data being exploited and exfiltrated from the network despite early detection.  
The second test, Test 2, stressed the system. The goal was to simulate heavy 
traffic use on the website to observe the ability of RAMPART to process all the events in 
a timely fashion. Despite the stress on the system, RAMPART updated the router 
IPTable, quickly adapting to the dynamic environment. The system performed as 
expected, updating the router to block the suspect IP addresses for a preset amount of 
time of four minutes. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
SME required 
RAMPART integrated numerous expertise fields and computer applications into a 
single capstone project. In order to successfully implement the system, team members 
expanded their knowledge considerably in the following areas: Cyber Threat Domain, 
MS IIS, MS SQL, MySQL, Ubuntu, Apache, IDS/IPS, Vyatta, Plink, Cygwin, Expect, 
SIEM, current cybersecurity measures, VMs, Tor, GINA, Innovation, KM, and MCDA. 
This is not an all-encompassing list but adequately represents the wide breadth of 
knowledge needed to implement RAMPART. The team heavily relied on the technical 





While the information apparatus is relatively simple to use when configured, each 
system component incorporated in the SoS must be itself configured and executed 
appropriately. The GINA framework can integrate many disparate components, but each 
needed to be configured correctly to communicate with GINA. A misconfiguration of any 
single component of the SoS can negatively impact the overall performance or even 
cause it to fail. Proper configuration of each component and expertise in its function can 
overcome many technical obstacles that arise in the system implementation. 
Troubleshooting 
Understanding where component system misconfiguration and the information  
apparatus implementation can malfunction presents trouble shooting challenges; 
however, these were remedied through reconfiguration of the information apparatus. Any 
SoS has numerous disparate components. Failures in the proper function of any of one of 
these components can cause a malfunction requiring troubleshooting. However, isolating 
the exact cause of the problem is difficult and requires expert technical knowledge and 
superior troubleshooting skills. Typically, the team found the best course of action to be a 
general reconfiguration of the entire system or following the information apparatus step 
by step until the problem was found; see Appendix G. 
Configured vs Compiled 
Many software programs are written with one configuration set and only allow 
small modifications to its base programming before requiring new programming code 
and recompiling. Adding another system to the original software would require a 
computer programmer to modify the underlying software code and then recompile it. 
However, a VRDM information apparatus would only require a configuration change. 
This saves a significant amount of time in comparison to traditional programming 
methods, and the configuration changes would not require a computer programmer to 
execute the modifications. Operators could configure RAMPART to incorporate 




security policies, system and network components, and new cyber threat vectors not 
previously addressed can all be integrated into the system in order to adapt it to the 
dynamic cyber threat environment. Through information modeling, RAMPART could 
then include these changes without requiring new programming or recompiling. 
C. IMPLICATIONS  
VRDM information apparatus’ could have significant impact on cybersecurity. 
The near real-time capability to detect and respond to attacks requires the ability to 
rapidly parse the web log database against the set cybersecurity criteria. This requirement 
can overwhelm the VRDM information apparatus if it is not adequately equipped and 
configured. However, the system has demonstrated the ability to process approximately 
50,000 lines of table rows before degrading. The database rows could be populated by 
web, system, or application logs giving network administrators extreme flexibility in their 
use of the system to protect the network. RAMPART may be a viable alternative or 
replacement to current cybersecurity mechanisms, approaches, and procedures. Though 
this capstone is the implementation of a proof-of-concept model, the envisioned system 
would be able to aggregate data from any system with the capability to store their logs in 
a database. 
RAMPART shows high rates of true positive hits combined with a small 
percentage of positive false hits. This accuracy is a strength, though it cannot claim to be 
impregnable. The system thus allows operators to use automated log analysis. Thus, they 
can focus on other cybersecurity practices instead of spending critically valuable man-
hours on time-consuming log analysis.  
RAMPART could be an affordable alternative to many cybersecurity solutions. 
Automated log analysis reduces the time and personnel required to conduct effective, 
routine log analysis to protect the network. Also, the system is simple to use and manage, 




Integrating multiple data sources into RAMPART will enhance situational 
awareness and allow operators to efficiently discover, remediate, and mitigate attacks, 

































Cyberspace is an inherently open and unsecure domain wherein cyber attacks 
threaten the network integrity of organizations and significantly influence the United 
States’ overarching strategy on national security. Hence, cybersecurity is critically 
important to modern, connected societies, including large organizations, militaries, and 
governments. Many network intrusions remain undiscovered for months. Reducing the 
time required for detecting, containing, and mitigating cyber attacks can significantly 
increase the cyber defenses of any organization. By implementing innovative 
technologies, the DOD will be better-equipped to defend against cyber attacks. 
Furthermore, extensible system technologies, e.g., VRDM information modeling could be 
easily modified to stay ahead of evolving cyber threats, e.g., zero day exploits. 
The team used VRDM to methodically build and configure a system to 
automatically aggregate disparate data and information into a single system. This process, 
in effect, resolved the human-intensive task of log analysis, specifically the detection and 
subsequent response to cyber attacks. The automation of this process exhibited a near 
real-time capability and solution to identify and defend against phpMyAdmin attacks. 
RAMPART’s automatic response capability blocked many of these attacks before they 
could breach the network and cause damage. 
RAMPART is a proof-of-concept demonstrating VRDM in cybersecurity for and 
network defense of a SoS. The capability of the GINA framework to aggregate data from 
multiple sources and perform connection validation of online identities using 
configurable, weighted decision models, makes it an ideal platform for connecting 
disparate cyber defense tools into a SoS. RAMPART does not require programming to 
expand and incorporate new cyber defense components. It automates log analysis 
providing operators a more efficient way to examine of network events, enabling them to 
detect and respond to cyber attacks quickly. The automatic response from RAMPART 




payload. RAMPART potentially could be the cornerstone of an organization’s 
cybersecurity portfolio. 
A. FUTURE WORK 
The working prototype has demonstrated the ability of a configured VRDM 
implementation to detect and respond to a threat using human decision-making criteria. 
Additional criteria can be added, thereby providing increased functionality to the base 
model. RAMPART can be used to explore other network defense applications. 
Suggestions for extending RAMPART include: 
Tor Scanning of Network Systems 
 The Tor network obfuscates a user’s IP address; however, RAMPART could 
easily monitor for obfuscated attacks through the use of Tor exit node detection, in 
conjunction with searching for calls for specific services not used via the Tor network. 
Network Mapper Scan for Open Ports 
Nmap is a useful, multi-purpose tool for administrators to monitor system 
information available to the public. Conversely, it is a powerfully exploitation tool to 
cyber attackers, who could perform scans of an organization’s network ports. Notably, 
they can scan for open ports on client servers and hosts that are accessible via the 
Internet. Using Nmap, the attacker can record all open ports and formulate a future 
attack. The ability for network administrators to recognize these external port scans and 
correlate them to other possible attack criteria on the network would provide a critical 
advantage in the defense of networks. 
SQL Injection Attacks 
SQL injection attacks can be some of the most devastating attacks. If the database 
server is misconfigured, an attacker could connect and gain remote access to the system. 
In some cases, the attacker could obtain administrative privileges to conduct further 




simple checks, such as looking for behaviors such as over use of a specific string in the 
URL. This could prove to be a pivotal step toward heightening network security. 
Cyber-Defense Mechanisms – Anti-virus, IDS/IPS, Firewalls 
Anti-virus companies play a vital role in providing network security. If anti-virus 
software were to be combined with the RAMPART response system, it could block 
viruses and monitor for possible data exfiltration or the use of malware. Also, IDS and 
IPS such as FireEye and Snort can detect intrusions, but they do not necessarily actively 
respond to the intrusion (in near real-time or at all). IDS and IPS detection capabilities 
could be coupled with the RAMPART response capabilities, making it a more capable 
cyber defensive and preventative tool. 
Log Analysis  
Many systems output security logs to databases, allowing them to be rapidly 
queried. RAMPART could take specific segments of a database as criteria in its decision 
process and allow system administrators to specify certain log attributes and possible 
flags. These log attributes and flags could alert the administrator to unexpected changes 
on the system or network, e.g., a “new user” added in the middle of the night when no 
one is expected to be logged into the system. Network administrators could tailor the 
system for a given OS on the network. 
Dynamic Growth of IP Blacklists; Statefulness 
 RAMPART can communicate with any database through various network 
connections, thus the ability exists to centralize and update this list globally without 
network administrator action. This capability would streamline the process to update 
IPTables across the entire DOD enterprise, creating a more robust defensive posture. 
Increase in the Database Parse Capability in the GINA Framework 
Currently, the GINA framework searches for triggering criteria within the 
database every three minutes. If the system cannot make it through the full database 




not be scanned for the triggering criteria. An increase in the speed of the GINA 
architecture will allow for a more efficient style of information parsing which would 
increase effectiveness. Alternatively, an automated script could be developed that 
archives the database when it reaches a preset size. Either of these solutions would allow 
the system to continue to protect and respond to threats in a dynamic, automated fashion. 
Outdated, Legacy Systems 
RAMPART could be configured to incorporate functional and valuable legacy 
systems. The DOD continues to depend on numerous legacy systems, but replacing these 
systems across the entire military is exceedingly expensive in a fiscally restrained 
environment. In some cases, these systems lack adequate cybersecurity and struggle to 
run modern cyber defense applications. However, RAMPART could be used to support 
log management. This would not only improve their cyber protection, but may also 
continue to extend their usefulness and function. 
Insider Threats 
Insider threats are a national security problem and have recently risen as a 
security concern for many intelligence agencies. RAMPART can monitor for suspicious 
indicators within system databases and network log files. For example, network 
administrators could configure RAMPART to look for users who attempt to copy 
massive numbers of files to portable media such as optical disks or USB drives. The 
ability of RAMPART to manage multiple decision criteria could provide additional 
protection to an organization against insider threats. 
As attackers develop and propagate new viruses and exploits in cyberspace, the 
threat to network systems is always evolving in complexity and scope. DOD cyber forces 
should be equipped with state of the art and innovative technologies and tools. All the 
aforementioned future work could significantly strengthen network security. They are 





APPENDIX A: GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK 
ARCHITECTURE 
Development on GINA was launched at NPS in 2004 as a Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreement. In 2005, GINA was a DOD Information Assurance 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) Certification Class 3 Network-Aware 
Business Data Management System, and was released and integrated into various U.S. 
government organizations in 2006 [25]. 
GINA is an executable, component-based, platform agnostic, model-driven 
architecture that provides data, information, and knowledge interoperability, and enables 
the customization of services for systems. It is a modeling environment used to configure 
VRDM implementations into executable systems. Research scientist and developer of 
GINA DPIMS [26] Anderson explains, “GINA is able to take programs and devices and 
represent them in a way that is understood by every other represented application in the 
GINA environment. Configuring—not programming—creates relationships between the 
individual components so that stove-piped technologies become accessible and part of the 
greater GINA universe” [27]. Operators at NPS’ ITACS employ GINA to facilitate data 
sharing across a wide and diverse spectrum of digital formats. GINA expert Ryan Hale 
explains, “The problem with all of these different systems is that they speak different 
languages. . . . GINA does not require the end systems to be modified to talk to them, 
GINA is built to understand all of the various data inputs or ‘languages’ and then creates 
links and relationships” [26]. 
As systems, networks, and data management grow increasingly complex, in turn, 
so do labor intensive and disparate systems. A colossal task for many organizations, 
especially Fortune 500 companies and the DOD, is setting up infrastructure to facilitate 
the sharing of copious amounts of data and resources with partners, clients, and 
providers. This desirable infrastructure should be ubiquitous, agnostic, support multiple 





GINA offers a multipurpose and innovative solution, Anderson describes how 
GINA provides a platform, facilities, and management of information and services across 
networks and all domains as “[GINA] can aggregate and objectify information from an 
unlimited set of heterogeneous information sources or service providers into a common 
information apparatus that can be tailored to specific system behaviors based on the 
relationship of the user to the information” [13]. 
Historically, interoperability and integration were seen as a task or problem of 
transferring data from one system into another. This was not a well-defined approach, 
and the first attempt at developing an approach was Enterprise Application Integration 
(EAI). EAI utilized an adaptor-mapping-based approach, in which adaptors understood 
how to communicate with one another using various standard systems. In effect, adaptors 
were integrated by wiring applicable components together. This four step approach could 
be described as: (1) adapt system A, (2) adapt system B, (3) map A to B, and (4) map B 
to A. This approach proved effective in managing two systems, however as environment 
became geometrically complex and the number of systems grew, it became evident that a 
composite approach was required to compensate for the addition of subsequent systems. 
A “Star integration” approach was created to support this expanding environment [27]. 
In a Star integration approach, a standard system is constructed in which all 
systems can communicate. This approach, even for two systems, is relatively more 
complex than the four-step approach described above. For example, the aforementioned 
four-step approach for integrating two systems, now becomes a seven-step approach: (1) 
adapt system A, (2) adapt system B, (3) define system C as the superset of A and B, (4) 
map A to C, (5) map C to A, (6) map B to C, and (7) map C to B. Extending this 
approach by adding a third system adds four more steps: (8) adapt D, (9) extend C to 
include D, (10) map C to D, and (11) map D to C. As the number of systems increases, 
this approach or model begin to pay dividends. For instance, for 20 systems, there are 85 
steps versus 400 for the adaptor-mapping-based approach. Furthermore, the 85 steps do 




Star integration functions as designed when the relationship between the datasets 
in A and the datasets in B are one-to-one. As the number of systems increases, the 
complexity of interaction increases. The Star integration does not account for 
interoperability problems such as accountability, summarization, analysis, navigation, 
and semantic interoperation. To counter this problem, a set of new tools was developed, 
such as data mining, Online Analytical Processing (OLAP); Extraction, Transformation, 
and Loading (ETL); Enterprise Information Integration (EII); virtual databases. Each tool 
provides a partial solution, so multiple tools are required to address a given 
organization’s needs. This multi-tool solution presents a new problem of getting the 
interoperability tools to interoperate [27]. A universal solution to address an 
organization’s interoperability requirements is dependent on the organization’s needs. To 
formulate a near-universal solution, a good starting point is to redefine the problem. 
GINA’s inherent interoperability provides logical and functional, advancements and 
advantages over traditional architectural models and approaches; see Figure 19 and Table 
2. 
 
 Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) versus GINA, from [27]. Each SoS Figure 19. 
is limited by a scalability problem of quadratic complexity. GINA 








APPENDIX B: AVERAGE TIME TO DETECT AND CONTAIN 
NETWORK INTRUSIONS 
For many organizations, cyber attacks and intrusions go unnoticed for significant 
periods because the evidence of their activity is buried in thousands of lines of logs. 
According to Mandiant, an American cybersecurity firm that released a report accusing 
China of repeated cyber espionage intrusions, victim organizations failed to discover 
cyber attackers on their networks for an average of 229 days during 2013. This standard 
had improved from the median number of 243 days reported in 2012 [29]. The 
cybersecurity company Trustwave reported a median number of 87 days for an 
organization to detect an intrusion in 2014 and a median of 114 days from intrusion to 
containment [30]; see Figures 20 and 21. 
 
 Median Number of Days between Intrusion to Containment, after [30]. Figure 20. 
Trustwave reports a median of 87 days before an organization detects a 






 Median Number of Days between Intrusion to Detection to Containment Figure 21. 
for both Self Detection and Third Parties, after [30]. Organizations ‘self-
detecting’ or internally detecting network intrusions significantly lowers the 
time required to detect and mitigate a cyber attack. 
The majority of organizations struggle to find intrusions internally without the aid 
of external help from contracted cybersecurity specialists. In 2013, 33 percent of the 
organizations serviced by Mandiant detected the intrusion themselves, while 37 percent 
of the organizations had discovered their intrusions in 2012 [29]. Trustwave reveals a 
similar number, reporting that 71 percent of organizations fail to detect intrusions 
themselves [30]. In 2011, Verizon’s annual Data Breach Investigations Report revealed 
that 92 percent of intrusions are not detected by the victim organization. This improved to 
69 percent in 2013 [31]. Notably, external parties detect the majority of cyber breaches in 
an organization. Improving an organization’s ability to internally detect cyber attacks 





 Percent of breaches discovered external of victim, after [31]. Improving Figure 22. 
an organization’s ability to internally detect cyber attacks significantly 
reduces the time to detect and mitigate them. 
Reducing the time to detect an intrusion enables an organization to respond faster 
to an attack and limit its impact [9]; see Figures 23, 24, and 25. The time between the 
initial intrusion and detection allows an attacker to spread secretly, pivot, and execute an 
attack through an organization’s networks [9]. After the organization’s networks are 
logically and physically secure from the attacker, the resulting damage from the attack 





 Median Time to Detect an Initial Intrusion, after [30]. Trustwave Figure 23. 
Holdings, an information security company serving 2.5 million business 
customers in 96 countries, compiled these figures by analyzing 691 data 
breach investigations conducted in 2013 from their global security 





 Median time to contain an intrusion after detection, after [30]. Figure 24. 
Trustwave Holdings, an information security company serving 2.5 million 
business customers in 96 countries, compiled these figures by analyzing 691 
data breach investigations conducted in 2013 from their global security 





 Median Time from Intrusion to Containment, after [30]. Trustwave Figure 25. 
Holdings, an information security company serving 2.5 million business 
customers in 96 countries, compiled these figures by analyzing 691 data 
breach investigations conducted in 2013 from their global security 
operations centers located around the world. For many organizations, cyber 
attacks and intrusions go unnoticed for significant periods of time.  
Any delays in detecting, containing, mitigating, or purging the attacker from the 
organization’s networks gives the attacker more time to exploit the network or cause 
damage [32]. Organizations struggle to detect cyber attacks with many larger 
organizations taking months or years to detect intrusions [9]. In 2013, Verizon’s Data 
Breach Investigations Report revealed that 84 percent of network compromises took 
hours or less to commit [33]. The same report continues by stating that 22 percent of the 
time, containing these attacks takes months; see Figure 26. A delay in cyber defense 
















APPENDIX C: DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS 
The DOD faces the major challenge of proactively managing information. In 
2014, it is estimated that global data grows at 2.5 exabytes per day [34]. Organizations 
structured to create, update, organize, access, and transfer their collective body of 
knowledge to their operators and decision makers, provide a flexible decision-making 
process, moreover, an adaptable and extensible solution. Organizations are compelled to 
craft innovative solutions to combat challenges and threats to their security and regular, 
steady state operations in cyberspace. Organizations, specifically system engineers and 
administrators, could benefit extensively by implementing innovative technologies into 
the design, structure, and hardening of their networks. Taking the innovative possibilities 
of VRDM information modeling, the capstone team explored different decision-making 
frameworks and processes, to conceptualize and design a working model for our use case 
problem. 
A. MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING 
The team incorporated Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) into our SoS 
environment and VRDM construct. MCDA, also referred to as Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM), is required to organize efficiently and effectively utilize data. MCDA 
is a related discipline and synthesis of mathematics, operations research, and operations 
science, in that it employs advanced analytical methods to arrive at optimal decisions and 
solutions. MCDA, when ideally applied to a given environment, will maximize profit, 
performance, and yield, and conversely minimize loss, risk, and cost of the desired 
objective.  
MCDA evaluates various complementary, supplementary, and conflicting criteria 
in making a decision. Quantitative and qualitative measures such as costs and 
performance are inputs to the decision-making model. In the cyber domain, emerging 
technologies introduce both enhanced solutions as well as complex problems. For the 




properly define and structure the problem, in order to accurately evaluate multiple criteria 
and make informed decisions. The National Research Council (NRC) codifies MCDA as 
“a deliberative process for bringing together disparate public and stakeholder views to 
help generate decision criteria, rank-order alternatives, deal with uncertainty in regard to 
competing objectives, and formulate management trade-offs between objectives in the 
context of risk” [35]. MCDA is a consolidation of methods employed to better 
comprehend, structure, and enhance decision processes. According to Linkov and Seager, 
conventionally, the MCDA process consists of the following four steps [35]: 
• Structuring the problem by identifying and assessing various criteria 
through stakeholder elicitation that apply to the given decision. 
• Eliciting model parameters, such as alternatives, decision criteria, relative 
weights, and preference threshold, and then evaluating the performance 
of each alternative on each criterion. 
• Applying a decision algorithm that ranks each alternative from highest to 
lowest preference. 
• Analyzing results of the model and repeating the process from Step 1 or 
Step 2 to re-evaluate the results. 
This evaluation process organizes and synchronizes information from multiple 
sources, for example from various databases. It then streamlines complex, diverse, and 
potentially conflicting objectives to formulate an optimal solution for the decision maker. 
In Step 1 of the process, good decisions are framed by identifying and defining 
objectives; specifically, objectives that are “specific, measureable, realistic, and time-
dependent” [36]. In Step 2, alternatives are identified, categorized, and classified to 
achieve the desired, defined objectives. Next, in Step 3, criteria are developed which are 
used to evaluate and assign values to each alternative according to the degree it 
contributes to reaching the set objectives. Also, in Step 3, a decision algorithm ranks the 
weighted alternatives against the cost-effectiveness of the competing criteria. Finally, 
Step 4 provides an alternative to the decision maker. However, even after the selection of 
an alternative, continual re-evaluation and further analysis can produce a superior 




to reassess past decisions continuously. In effect, this evaluation process systematically 
formalizes lessons learned and communicates them to decision makers enabling them to 
make better future decisions [36], [37]; see Figure 27. 
 
 Multi Criteria Decision-making Process, after [36]. MCDA is a Figure 27. 
reiterative process, and a built in feedback loop provides a forum to reassess 
past decisions continuously. This evaluation process systematically 
formalizes lessons learned and communicates them to decision makers. 
B. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT  
The Army Field Manual 6–01.1 describes KM as “the process of enabling 
knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision-making” [38]. 
KM seeks the following objectives: 1) Shared knowledge by orientating and 
synchronizing people, processes, and tools within an organization. 2) Collaborative 




knowledge to facilitate and expedite organizational decision-making. KM is not a 
technical system or a piece of software, but a person-driven process [39]. However, 
technical systems enable KM and significantly enhance an organization’s ability to 
channel pertinent data to their decision makers; see Figure 28. 
 
 How Knowledge Management Enhances Decision-Making, from [38]. Figure 28. 
Technical systems enable KM and significantly enhance an organization’s 
ability to channel pertinent data to decision-making. 






 Knowledge Management Process, from [38]. RAMPART, a technical Figure 29. 
KM solution, creates an information apparatus for KM by integrating 
multiple sources into a single framework allowing automated decision-
making on the correlated data and subsequent system responses. 
• Assess – This step evaluates the flow of data in the organization. It 
identifies obstacles to the free flow of data. It creates methods to mitigate 
or eliminate the obstructions. 
• Design – A solution to improve the flow of data is developed. This step 
creates a strategy to improve the data transfer through products or 
processes. In a technical solution, the design phase would oversee the 
creation of the proposed information system. 
• Develop – This step combines the products from the two previous steps 
of Assess and Design into an actionable solution appropriate for the 
organization. For a technical solution, this would be actual construction 
of the information system. 
• Pilot – The solution from the Develop phase is created, deployed, and 
tested with organization. This solution is a test solution to identify any 
problems and to validate it as a KM solution for the organization. 
• Implement – This final step sees the operational deployment of the 
solution including training operators and coaching personnel in their roles 




deploying the solution, the system continues to be monitored and refined 
to assess and improve results. 
At NPS, ITACS would benefit from a method that decreases the amount of time 
required for an operator to discover and respond to a cyber attack. The team implemented 
the following five steps of the KM process for the ITACS use case. 
• Assess – The team observed and identified the needs and desires of the 
operators protecting their systems from malicious traffic. Their TTPs and 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) were consulted to help identify a 
technical solution to improving their data flow and enabling their 
operators’ greater access to all the data and respond faster to a cyber 
attack. 
• Design – Our RAMPART team brainstormed and outlined a system that 
would increase their access to the necessary data, to find an attack, and 
then react. Their current methods had operators crawling through 
numerous logs to compare data from different sensors and cybersecurity 
tools to first identify an attack. Comparing all the data was very time-
consuming often causing many cyber attacks to go undiscovered for 
weeks. Contributing to the delay in identifying cyber attacks, ITACS was 
undermanned. ITACS needed a solution that brought all the data from the 
various logs into a easier to use format and ideally in one place, reducing 
the time spent searching the various, separate logs. The solution needed 
to decrease the necessary manpower needed to discover cyber attacks on 
the networks. Lastly, the solution needed to reduce the amount of time it 
took to respond to a cyber attack either through near real-time 
notification to the operator or through an automatic response to attacks in 
accordance with their established TTPs and SOPs.  
• Develop – Our team created a system that delivers a KM solution by 
providing the operator aggregated data from his various cyber-defense 
systems. Data collected from these numerous sources would all feed a 
single aggregated module enabling the information apparatus to respond 
automatically to attacks identified per criteria preset by the operator.  
• Pilot – Our proof of concept system, named RAMPART, is an 
implementation of a VRDM executable information apparatus in the 
GINA framework that is designed to collect data from the network and 
identify potential phpMyAdmin attacks using decision processes driven 
by real world operations procedures and SME decision-making. 
• Operational Implementation – After validating the system through 




solution to ITACS to improve their decision-making and cyber attack 
response. 
RAMPART is a technical KM solution. It creates an information apparatus for 
KM through integrating multiple sources into a single framework allowing automated 
decision-making on the correlated data and subsequent system responses. It utilizes 
components of effective cyber-protection tools as components to streamline data flow to 
operators thus enhancing their decision-making. Incorporating data from multiple 
sensors, databases, cyber-tools, and processes, RAMPART creates an integrated model 
enabling operators and decision-making to identify and react faster to any cyber attack by 
automating log analysis. 
C. RAMPART AS A DYNAMIC CYBER KM 
The team integrated tenets of KM and MCDA into the elastic GINA framework. 
Integration was possible because the GINA framework creates an “object-oriented, 
software-based modeling environment for the modeling of various data sources and 
[allows] queries and transactions across those sources” [28]. Additionally, GINA 
optimizes “the use of existing systems, provides extensions to those systems, presents 
information to other systems and users from existing systems, maximizes the reuse of 
existing data and systems, and creates new uses and systems that seamlessly interoperate 










APPENDIX D: ITACS INCIDENT HANDLING PROCEDURES 
NPS ITACS cyber incident handling employs the following five phases; see Figure 30. 
• Identification; see Figure 31. 
• Containment; see Figure 32. 
• Neutralization; see Figure 33. 
• Recovery; see Figure 34. 
• Assessment and Documentation; see Figure 35. 
 







Operators follow these basic procedures: 
 
• Use FortiAnalyzer, a tool that records the source and destination IP 
addresses and identifies attacks via pattern and characteristic recognition. 
Look up webfilter logs for the IP identified as the non-DOD (Hostile) IP 
for a time period surrounding the time of the event. 
• Attach those logs in the FortiAnalyzer tab of the IACD issue created for 
this incident. 
• Look up the non-DOD IP in IP Audit (for the time period of the attack) 
• Attach those logs under IP Audit. 
• If Snort generated a real-time report on this incident, include the Snort 
Alert in the “Other Logs” tab. 
• Use a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) to look up the URL and 
other information regarding the non-DOD IP. 
• Capture the information in the non-DOD IP block of the issue. If the 
information is hosted on a webpage, a link will suffice. 
• Document the IP(s) at NPS that were affected by the attack. 
• Use the attack classification provided by the alerting sensor to name the 





 ITACS Incident Handling Process – Identification Phase. Figure 31. 
B. CONTAINMENT 
Operators follow these basic procedures: 
• SafeConnect (Preferred for end users) 
• If possible, use the machine’s MAC address to block, as it is unique to an 
affected machine and will not lead to incorrect blocks. 
• If the MAC cannot be identified, use the IP Address. 
• Failing 1 and 2, block the user by username. 
• Servers shall be blocked. 






 ITACS Incident Handling Process – Containment Phase. Figure 32. 
C. NEUTRALIZATION 
Operators follow these basic procedures: 
• Is the system a Government Computer (if so re-image). 
• If it is a personal system send instruction on how to clean. 
• Is the system a server (servers are handled by System Administrators 
only). 
• Was it a network based attack? 








 ITACS Incident Handling Process – Neutralization Phase. Figure 33. 
 
D. RECOVERY 
Operators follow these basic procedures: 
• Identify how far back you need to go (time of infection, what system is 
affected). 
• Compare with the available backup media (dates and systems available). 
• Perform restoration that meets the required coverage. 
• Complete restoration by updating the system to bridge the gap from 
restore the point to operational status. 
• Re-image hard drive from known clean image. Do not attempt to “clean” 





 ITACS Incident Handling Process – Recovery Phase. Figure 34. 
 
E. ASSESSMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 
Operators follow these basic procedures: 
• Conduct a debrief on the incident. 
• Reassess the system configuration for possible changes. 
• Correct deficiencies and update procedures. 
• Create a Snort rules to alert Admins of future incidents  
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APPENDIX E: RAMPART TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
RAMPART implements an automated cyber threat response model prototype that 
demonstrates an intrusion protection capability within GINA. GINA has no published 
history of implementation as an IPS.  
A. RAMPART DECISION MODEL 
In order to establish a threat level, the model must maintain state with each 
network event. An event is generally a service request from an IP address to a certain 
server socket at a certain time. RAMPART uses the remote IP address as the identity. 
The state table exists in the information apparatus database on the GINA server. The 
result of each test is recorded as a binary value maintained within a four-tuple in context 
of IP address. The four-tuple is {IP, Test1Result, Test2Result, Test3Result}. 
The analysis and decision consists of three tests against an Apache web log event: 
• Request for “phpMyAdmin.” phpMyAdmin is a database administration 
service common to Apache web servers. Access to this site is generally 
reserved for database administrators. We assume that the database 
administrator will not access the site while simultaneously using Tor or a 
website scanning tool. 
• “404” page not found status errors in a web server log. When these errors 
exist in rapid secession (more than one with identical source IP and 
timestamp to the second), it is evidence of automated activity. We 
assume that scanning activity is not always bad. For instance, search 
engine spiders and vulnerability assessment scanners may not be a reason 
for alarm, but could both generate many rapid “404” page not found 
status errors. 
• Traffic with a source IP address of a Tor exit node. Tor traffic is not 
always malicious, e.g., there are instances where privacy is a legitimate 
concern. In such cases, Tor is a legal means to achieve that end. 
However, we assume that a malicious actor will obfuscate his IP address 
during a cyber attack to avoid attribution. 
Triggering on any one of the events alone would yield unacceptable numbers of 




though yields a decision scheme that correlates the indicators, allows weighting and 
simulates an analyst’s decision process based on sufficient indicating criteria. 
There are three possible outcomes of the decision model. 
• Someone is scanning the network and has invoked phpMyAdmin at the 
same time. 
• Someone is accessing phpMyAdmin, specifically from the Tor network. 
• Someone is scanning from the Tor network. 
B. ARCHITECTURE 
We used a database logging solution for an Apache web server hosting a 
phpMyAdmin website without any other form of intrusion protection. It is important to 
note that GINA natively operates on a Microsoft Windows server that uses IIS to host a 
DotNetNuke environment connected to a MS SQL backend database. The implication is 
that a configured GINA information apparatus will aggregate a MS SQL database from a 
Windows server and a MySQL database from a Linux server to implement an all-source 
common cyber picture. A further implication is that the model is inherently extensible 
and subject to reconfiguration based on use case evolution, accommodating changes in 
mission, technology, and threat changes. 
Apache Database Logging 
We chose Apache as a network attack target to demonstrate that suspicious 
requests to phpMyAdmin can be investigated computationally by modeling a cyber threat 
analyst’s decision-making process. The majority of web servers are Linux-based and we 
infer that there is a greater attack surface for Linux-based web servers. The threat 
detection model may also be applied to Microsoft IIS servers, but it would limit platform 
diversity for the demonstration. RAMPART monitors the Apache server loaded with 





We use a GINA model to access a MySQL database that stores all logs from an 
Apache web server. The Apache log table contains four columns of interest: Remote IP, 
URL, Status, and Timestamp. We create GINA X-Type elements, the key model 
concepts, for each of the source columns necessary to perform an automated analysis of 
the data within. The SQL server search processing overhead of queries remains on the 
source MySQL server; the GINA model only reads in records that are specifically 
requested for the analysis. The GINA model will use string compares against the columns 
to determine the truth table that was outlined in the capstone scope. 
Signal 
The time interval for analysis of logged data is one minute. We determined that a 
batch analysis at regular time intervals is more efficient than performing an analysis of 
each log entry as it is created. Attacks can occur at such rapid succession that the server 
can be overwhelmed with duplicate processes. Batch analysis in one process eliminates 
the attacker’s capability to perform a denial of service on the GINA server by 
overwhelming it with false positives. 
Threat Monitor 
A separate model process checks the values in the state table to determine if 
sufficient threat level exists to invoke an automated response. The threat monitor is part 
of a GINA “service chain” which begins after each minute interval analysis process 
completes. The threat monitor invokes a response with the source IP address as an input 
and also marks each record for deletion after it has been processed. The automated 
response invokes a special form that initiates a command line with arguments. This 
allows any command line process to be initiated from the model. 
Responder 
A GINA model may also be configured to execute Java applets, run shell 




append as many command line arguments as desired. In this case, the automated response 
consists of a command line execution of a batch file with the attacker’s IP address as the 
argument for each automated response. 
We use SSH scripting to communicate with external network hardware. Routers, 
servers, firewalls, and IPS generally support SSH as a secure management protocol. SSH 
commands can perform multiple security functions including: 
• Modifying firewall rules to block an offending address. 
• Updating a routing table to redirect an attacker to a honeypot. 
• Disabling certain protocols on an interface. 
SSH scripting can be implemented in a windows batch file by using a command 
line SSH program called Plink. Plink uses the IP address provided by the responder as an 
input and executes a command on the network router to block the attacker’s IP address. 
The threat monitor initiates a response via invocation of a GINA form (Responder) that 
receives the attacker’s IP address and initiates a command line execution of a batch file 
with the attacker’s IP address as a command line argument. The form also submits an 





APPENDIX F: RAMPART INSTALL PROCEDURE 
The cyber threat detection and response test range use both Linux and Microsoft 
servers. They are loaded in the following configurations: IIS (MS 2008), Apache RHEL 
6, MS SQL (MS 2008), MySQL (RHEL 6), and Vyatta (Debian Linux). Server 
installations assume base OS and SQL server installations have been completed by the 
user. The GINA and Apache portions of this appendix are a modified excerpt from the 
2014 thesis “Automated Cyber Threat Analysis and Specified Process Using Vector 
Relational Data Modeling” [1]. 
A. APACHE DATABASE 
Apache database enabling programs are mod-dbd, apr-dbd, mod-log-dbd, and mod-
vhost-dbd. Together the modules send server transaction logs to a MySQL database. 
Install procedure from RHEL 6 terminal: 
1. Subscribe to Software Repositories 
• yum install http://centos.alt.ru/repository/centos/5/x86_64/apr-util-1.4.1-
1.el5.x86_64.rpm 
• yum install http://yum.jasonlitka.com/EL5/x86_64/apr-util-1.3.9-
1.jason.2.x86_64.rpm 
• yum install http://mirror.centos.org/centos/6/os/x86_64/Packages/apr-
util-mysql-1.3.9-3.el6_0.1.x86_64.rpm 
2. Install Software Dependencies with the Following Commands in a Terminal 
Emulator 
• yum install httpd-devel –y 
• yum install mysql-server mysql –y 
• yum install phpMyAdmin –y 
• yum upgrade mysql –y 




• yum install python-abi –y 
• yum install python-crypto –y 
• yum install python-paramiko –y 
• yum install ftp://ftp.muug.mb.ca/mirror/centos/6.5/os/x86_64/Packages/
libzip-0.9-3.1.el6.x86_64.rpm -y 
• yum install http://dev.mysql.com/get/Downloads/MySQLGUITools/
mysql-workbench-community-6.0.9-1.el6.x86_64.rpm -y 
• wget https://dbd-modules.googlecode.com/files/dbd-modules-1.0.6.zip 
unzip dbd-modules-1.0.6.zip 
• apxs -c mod_vhost_dbd.c 
• apxs -i mod_vhost_dbd.la 
• apxs -c mod_log_dbd.c 
• apxs -i mod_log_dbd.la 
3. Configure httpd.conf – The Sequential Order of the Directives Matter 
• LoadModule dbd_module modules/mod_dbd.so 
• LoadModule log_dbd_module modules/mod_log_dbd.so 
• DBDriver mysql 
• DBDParams “host=localhost port=3306 dbname-Apache user=root 
pass=nossman” 
• CustomLog logs/access.sql “%{%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S}t, %a, 
%{remote}p, %U, %H, %f, %B, %m, %p, %>s” 
• DBDLog logs/access.sql “INSERT INTO Apache_log(Tsp, RemoteIP, 
RemotePort, URL, Protocol, Filename, Bytes, Method, SvrPort, Status) 
Values (%s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s)” 





 HTTPD configuration file showing the modification to include the Figure 36. 
Mod_Log_DBD parameters for writing to a database 
4. Restart Server then Start Services: 
• service mysqld start 
• service httpd start 
 
5. Test the Database by Opening a Browser Window to URL http://127.0.0.1/
phpMyAdmin 





 A MySQL database using MySQL-Workbench as a GUI. Logs are Figure 37. 
parsed from the httpd subsystem by mod-dbd and written to the database 
with the mod-apr module. 
B. GINA INSTALL 
GINA consists of three core components: IIS front end, DotNetNuke 
environment, and MS SQL server. Aggregation of detection and response models require 
the GINA application, ODBC drivers, and Plink. 
 
1. Standard GINA IIS Server 
• IIS-configuration 
• Dotenet Nuke configuration 
• GINA configuration 
2. Standard GINA SQL Server 
• Installation 
• Database restore 




3. ODBC Driver 
In order for GINA to read in values from MySQL databases, a MySQL ODBC 
driver is required as well a special connection in GINA. The ODBC driver is installed on 
the GINA SQL server. 
Procedure: 
(1) Obtain the MySQL ODBC driver from http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/
connector/odbc/ and install it on the GINA backend SQL server. 
(2) *NOTE: We use the 32 bit program for a 32 bit install of GINA (this is the 
IIS. Even though we are using a 64 bit Linux MySQL server, 32 bit is the correct choice. 
64 bit will not work on 32 bit GINA installs. 
(3) Run the ODBC program c:\Windows\SysWOW64\ODBCAD32.exe; see 
Figure 38. 








 The ODBC driver configuration program is located on the GINA IIS Figure 38. 
server and is configured to communicate with a remote Linux MySQL 
server. This program is the link between MS SQL and MySQL databases. 
 
 ODBC configurations are indexed in this GUI. A connection for each Figure 39. 
MySQL server must exist in this data source with a name. The name is 




(5) Click add and select MySQL ODBC 5.2 Unicode Driver; see Figure 40. 
 
 Many drivers can be loaded in the ODBC administration tool. This tool Figure 40. 
is a middleware component that is transparent once used as a source to 
VRDM X-Types. 
(6) Parameters required are: Data source name (This is what is referenced in 
GINA in the sources window), TCP/IP server, Port, Username, Password, and the 
database name on the remote server; see Figure 41. 
 
 The MySQL ODBC driver contains the IP address and port of the Figure 41. 
remote MySQL server. GINA references the “Data Source Name” as an X-




(7) When you click test you may get this; see Figure 42. 
 
 Authentication errors are common in system integrations. Errors like this Figure 42. 
can be mitigated by ensuring credentials exist on the remote data source 
before configuring the local connection. 
 
4. Apply Permissions to SQL Server for Remote Access 
Procedure: 
• mysql –u root –p<password here with no space after the -p> 
• CREATE USER ‘<username>‘@’<gina server IP address>‘ 
IDENTIFIED BY ‘password’; 
• GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON *.* TO ‘root’@’169.254.0.59’ WHICH 
GRANT OPTION; see Figure 44. 
 









• Attempt a test in the ODBC connector configuration [Test] button; see 
Figure 44. 
  
 The MySQL driver has an ODBC test option that verifies connectivity Figure 44. 
from the IIS server to the MySQL database server. Connectivity to the 
MySQL driver is verified from within VRDM by creating a form to verify 
the MySQL data can hydrate a form field.  
 
5. A GINA Source for the ODBC Connector Is Required 
Procedure: 
• Create an access code:  





 Database access codes are configured as a VRDM object and saved in a Figure 45. 
MS SQL server. MS SQL supports secure socket layer (SSL) and Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec) to encrypt the database credentials in transit. 
• Create a connection that has the same name as the ODBC connection 
created above. 





 ODBC connections are defined in the same manner as a database source. Figure 46. 
The location is the ODBC driver connection name instead of the MySQL 
database name. In essence, this connection is local to the ODBC driver 





• Create the source 
GINA/GINA/Sources NEW; see Figure 47. 
 
 A Source can be thought of as a valid table name which has been given a Figure 47. 
nickname. Here, the table name “Apache_log” is named “ApacheLogs.” 
The source can be referenced by X-Types inside the GINA modeling environment. 
 
6. Install Plink 
Procedure 
• Plink can be downloaded from http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/
x86/plink.exe. It is a small and simple program that does not require 






7. Install Ubuntu as Router with IPTables 
Procedure 
• Upon boot the system will ask for a user name and password before 
continuing  
• Enter user and password and make note as these will be the primary login 
for the system. 
• Initial install of Ubuntu will which of your NICs will be primary for the 
system (typically eth 0) please note it will be needed later during the 
install; see Figure 48. 
 
 Primary NIC Selection. Figure 48. 
• The system will install automatically and reboot to the login screen. 
Login to the system using aforementioned credentials; see Figure 49. 
 
 Ubuntu Login Prompt. Figure 49. 
• By default the root user is disabled. To enable the root account type the 
following and set a password. 






 Enabling Root Account. Figure 50. 
• Set the network interface IP’s by navigating to the c/etc/network folder 
then vi the interfaces file; see Figure 51. 
 
 Sample Interfaces File. Figure 51. 
• Install the IPTables-persistent package to allow for reloading of tables if 





 Installing IPTables-Persistent Package. Figure 52. 
• Prepare your IPTables file by using vi to create a file to build the 
IPTables from; see Figure 53. 
 
 Creating IPTables File. Figure 53. 
• To allow for ease of updating the IPTables build a small script to load the 










 Sample IPTables File (2 of 2). Figure 55. 
• Save the IPTables to the rules.v4 to make them persistent by typing 
“iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4” without the quotes then reboot the 









APPENDIX G: ROUTER UPDATE SCRIPT FIXES 
Team RAMPART tested the Responder module to ensure it was properly 
updating the router with threat IP addresses. The team started by running the block 
command manually from a command prompt on the GINA server. The command 
completed the IPTable update to the router and blocked the IP address from future 
attacks; see Figure 56. 
 
 Manual execution of router update. Figure 56. 
As the team transitioned from manually testing to fully automated testing of the 
system, it was discovered that the command was not completing; see Figure 57.  
 
 Fully automated system fault. Figure 57. 
GINA was stopped by the router and not allowed to execute the IPTable update. 
The team investigated the cause of this problem by adding echo lines to the runcommand 
file in order to track its progress throughout execution. This procedure also allowed 





 Echo lines added to the runcommand file. Figure 58. 
The completion of the batch file used in updating the router informed the team 
that it was a communication issue between the GINA server and the router. Based on the 
proper writing of the IP address and time stamps to the testresult.txts file by the script, the 
disconnect lay between the batch file and the router. In an attempt to isolate the problem, 
a Python script was written to test if the batch file was actually calling and executing the 
script; see Figure 59. 
 
 Python Script to Test the batch File. Figure 59. 
The sole purpose of this file was to take the batch file out of the equation to assess 
if GINA was properly executing the runcommand. Again, the file executed and wrote the 
test IP addresses to the text files, however failed to update the router. Additionally, the 
team looked at different logs produced by programs in use on the GINA server to ensure 
there were no errors in accessing the batch file. Also, the auth.log file on the router was 




discovered that there were no access attempts in the auth.log when GINA called the 
process. A valid access was logged when the command was manually executed as 
identified below; see Figure 60, 61 and 62. 
 
 Manual execution of the batch file to update the router. Figure 60. 
 
 GINA attempt to remotely update the router. Figure 61. 
 
 Failed login by the automated script via GINA. Figure 62. 
 
Next, the team looked at which user was executing the runcommand and the 
application pool of the IIS server. The team found that the user was a not a normal user 
account. The next change to execution was made to the application pool user for both the 
default and GINA application pools. The default user for this web service was “network 
service”; see Figure 63. 
 




Modification of the user in the IIS server itself did not result in updating the 
router. Also, the team learned that the GINA service is what controls the communication 
between GINA and the router. This service or user account is what the router sees each 
time a connection is attempted. With respect to SSH, the first time a user connects to a 
server they must accept the key from the server. The team’s inability to physically log 
onto the server as the user localsystem and SSH to the router to accept the key posed a 
problem. After speaking with a BKT technician about which users the GINA service was 
authorized to run, the team switched from the localsystem account to the administrator 
account; see Figure 64. 
 
 GINA service running as administrator. Figure 64. 
As an administrator, the team was able to execute the runcommand.bat file, make 
a full SSH connection, and update IPTables with threat IPs sent from the RAMPART 
system. Once the connection was established, the system was setup be continuously 
updated with threat IP’s. The system performed consistently and robustly as designed, 
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